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Scenario analysisDecarbonising the UK electricity mix is vital to achieving the national target of 80% reduction of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions by 2050, relative to a 1990 baseline.Muchwork so far has focused only on costs and GHG emis-
sions ignoring other sustainability issues. This paper goes beyond to assess the life cycle sustainability of different
electricity scenarios for the UK, extending to 2070. The scenarios include the main technologies relevant to the
UK: nuclear, gas, coalwith andwithout carbon capture and storage (CCS), wind, solar photovoltaics and biomass.
Three levels of decarbonisation are considered and the implications are assessed for techno-economic, environmen-
tal and social impacts on a life cycle basis. The results show that decarbonisation is likely to increase electricity costs
despite anticipated future cost reductions for immature technologies. Conversely, sensitivity to volatile fuel prices
decreases by two-thirds in all the scenarios with low-carbon technologies. To meet the GHG emission targets,
coal CCS can only play a limited role, contributing 10% to the electricity mix at most; the use of CCS also increases
other sustainability impacts compared to today, includingworker injuries, large accident fatalities, depletion of fossil
fuels and long-termwaste storage. This calls into question the case for investing in coal CCS. A very low-carbonmix
with nuclear and renewables provides the best overall environmental performance, but some impacts increase, such
as terrestrial eco-toxicity. Such a mix also worsens some social issues such as health impacts from radiation and
radioactive waste storage requirements. UK-based employment may more than double by 2070 if a renewables-
intensive mix is chosen. However, the same mix also increases depletion of elements nearly seven-fold relative to
the present, emphasising the need for end-of-life recycling. Very low-carbon mixes also introduce considerable
uncertainty due to low dispatchability and grid instability. With equal weighting assumed for each sustainability
impact, the scenario with an equal share of nuclear and renewables is ranked best.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Achieving the UK's legally-binding target of reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions by 80% by 2050 on 1990 levels (see Fig. 1)will require a
complete decarbonisation of theUK electricitymix (UKERC, 2009). This is
due to at least three reasons. First, electricity is by far the highest contrib-
utor to UK GHG emissions, being responsible for 79% of emissions from
the energy sector and 28% of the total national emissions in 2012
(DECC, 2013). Secondly, the share of electricity is expected to grow signif-
icantly in the future owing to the anticipated electriﬁcation of other sec-
tors, including transport (UKERC, 2009). It is also widely regarded that
decarbonisation of electricity is going to be relatively easier than of
other sectors as low-carbon technologies are either already available
or will be deployable in the near-to-medium future. Whilst in other
countries with differently structured economies, different sectors such
as agriculture or transport can make greater contributions to national
emissions, many nations face a similar challenge to that of the UK
owing to the increasing signiﬁcance of electricity as an energy source.zapagic).
. This is an open access article underThe decarbonisation of electricity is a very ambitious target, given the
current electricity mix in the UK which is dominated by fossil fuels, con-
tributingmore than 87% to the total (see Fig. 2).Muchwork has been car-
ried out so far in an attempt to ﬁnd out how thismight be achieved, often
using scenario analysis. Examples include work by the Tyndall Centre
(2005), UK Energy Research Centre (Ekins et al., 2013) and UK govern-
ment Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC, 2011a).
However, thus far the focus has been on direct GHG emissions from
power plants and the costs of transforming the electricity system to
meet the GHG emission targets. Indirect emissions from the whole life
cycle of power generation have only been considered in this context by
the Committee on Climate Change (2013) and the Transition Pathways
consortium (Hammond et al., 2013; Hammond and O'Grady, 2013),
with the latter also considering someenvironmental issues other than cli-
mate change. This leaves many other sustainability issues overlooked or
sparsely addressed, including a broad range of life cycle environmental
and social aspects. Therefore, if decarbonisation is seen as an opportunity
to provide more sustainable energy, these other issues should be consid-
ered across the whole life cycle of power options (rather than just emis-
sions from power plants) to prevent ‘leakage’ of impacts from one life
cycle stage to another.the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. UK greenhouse gas emissions and the 2050 legally-binding target (DECC, 2012).
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can be assessed on a range of sustainability issues on a life cycle basis and
how some present-day options compare under UK conditions (Stamford
and Azapagic, 2011; Stamford and Azapagic, 2012).With regard to future
electricity scenarios, the European NEEDS project carried out life cycle
sustainability assessment for several countries in Europe considering dif-
ferent environmental, economic and social aspects (Schenler et al., 2008).
However, no equivalent analysis exists for the UK.
Therefore, this paper applies a life cycle approach to assess the
sustainability of future electricity scenarios for the UK. Five scenarios
up to 2070 are consideredwith a range of technological options suitable
for the UK. The novelty of this work is at least three-fold: ﬁrstly, it
applies a full life cycle approach to scenario analysis of electricity gener-
ation in the UK which has not been done previously; secondly, it con-
siders the most comprehensive range of sustainability issues to date;
and thirdly, it goes beyond the usual time horizon of 2050 to consider
the implications of the electricity system transformation up to 2070.
The longer time frame is chosen to reﬂect better the longevity of
modern power plants, particularly nuclear reactors which have
lifespans of 60 years. Additionally, this allows the electricity mix to
change radically whilst allowing for reasonable build rates for individual
technologies.
The following section outlines the methodology and data used in
this study, including a description of the scenarios themselves. The
results are presented anddiscussed in theResults anddiscussion section
and the conclusions are drawn in the Conclusions section. Further de-
tails on the assumptions and results can be found in Supplementary
information. The life cycle models for the scenarios are available
within the Scenario Sustainability Assessment Tool (SSAT) v2.1 devel-
oped as part of this work. SSAT, which can be downloaded from
www.springsustainability.org/?page=tools, is an interactive tool
which also allows users to deﬁne their own scenarios and examine
the related sustainability implications.0
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Fig. 2. Electricity generation mix in the UK from 2005 to 2012 (DECC, 2013).Methodology
Life cycle sustainability assessment
A life cycle approach has been applied to assess the sustainability of
future electricity systems using techno-economic, environmental and
social sustainability indicators developed by Stamford and Azapagic
(2011) following extensive engagementwith stakeholders from industry,
government, academia and non-governmental organisations. In total,
there are 36 indicators which are summarised in Table 1. Each indicator
assesses a particular sustainability issue on a life cycle basis, from ‘cradle
to grave’. As shown in Fig. 3, the life cycle includes the construction and
decommissioning of power plants, extraction and processing of fuels (if
relevant), generation of electricity andwastemanagement. The following
electricity generation options are considered, each being relevant to UK
conditions and expected to play a major role in the future electricity
mix (DECC, 2011a):
• coal (subcritical pulverised) with and without carbon capture and
storage (CCS);
• natural gas (combined cycle gas turbine, CCGT);
• nuclear (pressurised water reactor, PWR);
• solar photovoltaics (PV);
• wind (offshore); and
• biomass (wood andMiscanthus pellets).
Further details on the technologies can be found in the
Technology data sources and assumptions section, following the de-
scription of the scenarios.
Future scenarios
Three main scenarios are considered, each with either one or two
sub-scenarios depicting possible futures for electricity in the UK to
2070; their characteristics are summarised in Table 2. All the scenarios
are driven by the need to reduce GHG emissions, as this is one of the
main energy policy drivers in the UK (DECC, 2011a,c). The three main
scenarios explore three different GHG reduction levels for electricity –
65%, 80% and 100% – by 2050 relative to 1990. The 100% reduction
from electricity is what is required to achieve the national target of 80%
reduction of GHGemissions. The other two targets are chosen to examine
the implications of falling short of this target with the 80% scenario
matching the national GHG emission reduction target and 65% being
less ambitious still. Note the following:
• The year 2050 is the target year for UK policy hence the reduction
targets in the scenarios relate to this year; however, the scenarios
extend to 2070 to consider implications beyond the target year.
• UK GHG emission reduction target refers to the direct emissions of
GHG rather than the life cycle emissions. Therefore, the reduction
targets considered in the scenarios also refer to the direct emissions;
however, the implications of reaching these targets are estimated on
a life cycle basis.
• The decarbonisation targets in the scenarios refer only to CO2, as
opposed to the basket of GHGs included in the national targets; how-
ever, direct emissions of non-CO2 GHGs from power plants typically
cause around 1% of the direct global warming impact, so this simpliﬁ-
cation should have negligible effect.
The narratives for scenarios 65% and 100% are based on those devel-
oped by the Tyndall Centre (Azapagic et al., 2011) but have been devel-
oped further to focus on electricity (as opposed to the original scenarios
which considered the whole UK energy system). The third scenario
(80%) has been developed as part of this research. The scenarios are
summarised in Table 2 and described in more detail below, together
with the sub-scenarios. They are also differentiated in terms of their
emission pathways in Fig. 4. The year 2009 is considered as a reference
year in this research as the most complete data sets were available for
Table 1
Summary of the indicators used for assessing the sustainability of electricity scenarios (after Stamford and Azapagic, 2011).
Sustainability issue Indicator Unit
Techno-economic Operability 1. Capacity factor (power output as a percentage of the maximum possible output) Percentage (%)
2. Availability factor (percentage of time a plant is available to produce electricity) Percentage (%)
3. Technical dispatchability (ramp-up rate, ramp-down rate, minimum up time,
minimum down time)
Summed rank
4. Economic dispatchability (ratio of capital cost to total levelised generation cost) Percentage (%)
5. Lifetime of global fuel reserves at current extraction rates Years
Technological lock-in resistance 6. Ratio of plant ﬂexibility (ability to provide trigeneration,
negative GWP and/or thermal/thermochemical H2 production) and operational lifetime
Years−1
Immediacy 7. Time to plant start-up from start of construction Months
Levelised cost of generation 8. Capital costs £/MWh
9. Operation and maintenance costs £/MWh
10. Fuel costs £/MWh
11. Total levelised cost £/MWh
Cost variability 12. Fuel price sensitivity (ratio of fuel cost to total levelised generation cost) Percentage (%)
Environmental Material recyclability 13. Recyclability of input materials Percentage (%)
Water eco-toxicity 14. Freshwater eco-toxicity potential kg 1,4 DCB‡ eq./kWh
15. Marine eco-toxicity potential kg 1,4 DCB‡ eq./kWh
Global warming 16. Global warming potential (GHG emissions) kg CO2 eq./kWh
Ozone layer depletion 17. Ozone depletion potential (CFC and halogenated HC emissions) kg CFC-11 eq./kWh
Acidiﬁcation 18. Acidiﬁcation potential (SO2, NOx, HCl and NH3 emissions) kg SO2 eq./kWh
Eutrophication 19. Eutrophication potential (N, NOx, NH4+, PO43−, etc.) kg PO43− eq./kWh
Photochemical smog 20. Photochemical smog creation potential (VOCs and NOx) kg C2H4 eq./kWh
Land use & quality 21. Land occupation (area occupied over time) m2 yr/kWh
22. Terrestrial eco-toxicity potential kg 1,4 DCB‡ eq./kWh
Social Provision of employment 23. Direct employment Person-years/TWh
24. Total employment (direct + indirect) Person-years/TWh
Human health impacts 25. Worker injuries No. of injuries/TWh
26. Human toxicity potential (excluding radiation) kg 1,4 DCB‡ eq./kWh
27. Total human health impacts from radiation (workers and population) DALY¥/kWh
Large accident risk 28. Fatalities due to large accidents No. of fatalities/PWh
Energy security 29. Amount of imported fossil fuel potentially avoided toe/kWh
30. Diversity of fuel supply mix Score (0–1)
31. Fuel storage capabilities (energy density) GJ/m3
Nuclear proliferation 32. Use of non-enriched uranium in a reactor capable of online refuelling;
use of reprocessing; requirement for enriched uranium
Score (0–3)
Intergenerational equity 33. Use of abiotic resources (elements) kg Sb eq./kWh
34. Use of abiotic resources (fossil fuels) MJ/kWh
35. Volume of radioactive waste to be stored m3/TWh
36. Volume of liquid CO2 to be stored m3/TWh
‡ 1,4-Dichlorobenzene.
¥ Disability-adjusted life years.
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tricity mix in recent years.
Potential electricity mixes to 2070
In total,ﬁve sub-scenarios are considered representingpossible elec-
tricitymix pathways to 2070: two based on the 65% scenario, two based
on the 100% scenario and one based on the 80% scenario. The electricity
mixes are depicted in Table 3 and Fig. 5. It should be noted that, congru-
ent with using scenario analysis as a tool, the intention is not to predict
whatwill happen, but simply to explore a range of possible and, in some
cases, extreme futures, to ﬁnd out what will be needed to achieve the
GHG emission targets.
Scenario 65% assumptions. In the 65% scenario, limited action is taken to
prevent climate change. GHG emissions from the economy as a whole
reduce by just 15% by 2050 compared to 1990. By 2070, the reduction
reaches 24%. Thismeans that the UKmisses, by a largemargin, its legally
binding requirement to reduce GHG emissions by 80% by 2050 (Climate
Change Act, 2008). The majority of the emissions reduction achieved in
this scenario is due to the electricity sector which decarbonises by 65%
by 2050 and 80% by 2070.
As shown in Table 3 and Fig. 5, two potential electricity mixes have
been investigated within the 65% scenario: 65%-1 and 65%-2. In 65%-1,
carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies become commercially
successful, but new nuclear build does not occur, perhaps as a result of
political opposition or economic difﬁculties. Under the 65% scenario,GHG emission constraints are not particularly tight, meaning coal and
gas continue to play a role well into the future, together contributing
13% of electricity even in 2070. In fact, it is assumed that the UK with-
draws from the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD), which
would otherwise reduce output from coal by 2016 (European Commis-
sion, 2001). (It is not clear what, if any, penalty the UK would incur by
withdrawing from the LCPD.) In 65%-1, coal CCS delivers the majority
of the GHG savings, although solar PV and wind also experience some
growth. Since coal plants in earlier periods continue to operate rather
than converting to biomass, large-scale biomass output does not
grow. Current nuclear power plants shut down according to their com-
mercial schedule, with Sizewell B being granted a life extension of
20 years as anticipated (World Nuclear Association, 2013). No further
nuclear power plants are added.
It is assumed that coal CCS is not viable until after 2020 (apart from
demonstration plants of negligible capacity). However, assuming
present-day capacity factors (see Table 6) approximately 9 GW of coal
CCS would then be installed between 2020 and 2035, 20 GW between
2035 and 2050 and a further 18 GW before 2070. This growth rate
correlates well with the ‘core MARKAL’ scenario in the Government's
Carbon Plan (DECC, 2011a), which anticipates 28 GW of CCS capacity
by 2050 (cf. 29 GW here). Expansion of renewables in 65%-1 is far less
than presently anticipated. For instance, planned offshorewind capacity
could exceed 33 GW in the next 10–15 years (The Crown Estate, 2014),
but that level is not reached until the 2060s in 65%-1, perhaps as a result
of reduction or withdrawal of government support. Until 2050, growth
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Fig. 3. The life cycles of the electricity generation technologies considered in this study.
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(Feed-in Tariffs Ltd., 2013); post-2050 deployment accelerates to around
115 MW/month.
Sub-scenario 65%-2 is similar to 65%-1, butwith the assumption that
nuclear new build goes ahead as well as coal CCS (see Fig. 5). Since, in
contrast with 65%-1, both of these technologies are available, the
required installed capacity can be reached with quite low build rates
of each: nuclear capacity in 2070 is only around 18 GW, whilst coalCCS totals approximately 16 GW. An amount of load-following is
expected with CCS plants whereas nuclear plants are mainly expected
to provide baseload, hence the total output of coal CCS is lower than
that of nuclear despite installed capacity being similar. In terms of
new nuclear, it is assumed that around 1.6 GW comes online by 2020,
equivalent to one Areva EPR (AREVA NP and EDF, 2007), followed by a
further 6.4 GW by 2035, another 6.4 GW by 2050 and ﬁnally 4 GW by
2070. The peak growth rate is therefore around 0.4 GW/year: far
Table 2
Summary of scenarios and sub-scenarios considered in this analysis (all reductions relative to 1990 levels).
Scenarios Sub-scenarios
65% • Limited action is taken to prevent climate change.
• Total (direct) UK GHG emissions reduce by 24% (including international aviation
and shipping) by 2070.
• Electricity is signiﬁcantly decarbonised, with emissions reduced by 65% by 2050
and 80% by 2070.
• Electricity demand increases slowly, increasing by 50% by 2070.
► 65%-1 Sub-scenario with coal CCS but no new nuclear build. The mix in
2070: 68% fossil and 32% renewables.
► 65%-2 Sub-scenario with both new nuclear build and coal CCS. The mix in
2070: 37% fossil, 30% nuclear and 33% renewables.
80% • Decarbonisation of electricity is intermediate between scenarios ‘65%’ and ‘100%’,
reaching 80% reduction by 2050 (in line with Government targets for the whole
economy) and eventually 98% by 2070.
• Follows the same electricity demand proﬁle as the 100% scenario.
► 80% Only one sub-scenario considered. Includes new nuclear build and
some coal CCS. The mix in 2070: 10% fossil, 29% nuclear and 61%
renewables.
100% • Similar cumulative whole-economy GHG emissions to UKERC's ‘Carbon Ambition’
scenario (UKERC, 2009) in line with the UK GHG budgets.
• Total UK GHG emissions reduce by 80% (including international aviation and
shipping) by 2070.
• GHG emissions from electricity are effectively zero by 2050.
• Total energy demand reduces by 30% by 2070, but electricity demand increases by
60% as transport and other services switch to electricity (demand peaks in 2050 at
78% higher than 1990, then declines to 60% with efﬁciency improvements)
► 100%-
1
Sub-scenario with no new nuclear build, dominated by solar PV and
offshore wind. The mix in 2070: 100% renewables.
► 100%-
2
Sub-scenario with new nuclear build and renewables. The mix in
2070: 50% nuclear and 50% renewables.
198 L. Stamford, A. Azapagic / Energy for Sustainable Development 23 (2014) 194–211lower than the historical maximum of 4.5 GW/year (in France from
1979–88) and sitting at the bottom end of the possible range suggested
by the Carbon Plan (DECC, 2011a). Thus, the required build rates of both
coal CCS and nuclear plants should be easily achievable.
Output from gas plants gradually declines as installed capacity is
replaced with coal CCS, nuclear and biomass due to their lower GHG
emissions. Conventional coal power only provides 3% of electricity by
2070, with some plants retired and others converted to biomass-only
(4.9% of supply in 2070). Expansion of solar PV in 65%-2 is almost iden-
tical to that in 65%-1. Offshore wind, however, expands slightly more
slowly, having an installed capacity of about 30 GW in 2070 (compared
to ~35 GW in 65%-1) due to less capacity being necessary as a result of
new nuclear build (which has lower assumed costs and is therefore
installed preferentially).
Scenario 80% assumptions. The 80% scenario provides a steady decarbon-
isation path for the electricity sector that achieves the Government's
stated aim of 80% GHG emission reduction by 2050 (DECC, 2011a).
The scenario assumes, therefore, that other sectors reduce their emis-
sions by similar percentages. This is contrary to the approach taken in
the 100% scenario and in the Carbon Plan, in which electricity brings
about the majority of UK emissions reductions, becoming virtually
‘zero carbon’ before 2050. Annual electricity demand steadily increases
as more services are electriﬁed, ﬁnally beginning to decline post-2050
as efﬁciency improvements outpace demand increases.
Only one illustrative electricitymix has been investigatedwithin this
scenario (see Table 3 and Fig. 5). It assumes a future energymix that in-
cludes both new nuclear and coal CCS. Renewables continue to increase
their grid penetration at a steady rate, resulting in a mix that is quite
evenly balanced between fossil, nuclear and renewable sources until
2050 when renewables begin to dominate. Thus, growth rates required0
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Fig. 4. Assumed pathways for reduction of direct GHG emissions from UK electricity for
different scenarios.for individual technologies are modest. Nuclear power, for example, ex-
periences 1.6 GW of new build by 2020, followed by 8.6 GW by 2035
and a further 8.6 GW by 2050, after which new build ceases. As in the
other scenarios, currently operating nuclear power plants shut down
according to their commercial schedule, with Sizewell B being granted
a life extension of 20 years (World Nuclear Association, 2013). Offshore
wind has a total installed capacity of approximately 23 GW by 2035,
which is considerably less than the currently planned capacity of over
33 GW by that time (The Crown Estate, 2014). By 2070, however, this
increases to around 50–55 GW. Solar PV experiences expansion slightly
higher than current rates until after 2035, atwhich point installation ac-
celerates, culminating in a total capacity of around 104 GW by 2070.
This is equivalent to about 35 million residential installations at current
sizes, although this number would likely decrease as PV efﬁciency im-
proves allowing higher capacities to be installed per unit area.
In comparison to scenarios in the Carbon Plan, this electricity mix is
most similar to “Higher renewables; more energy efﬁciency”, requiring
broadly similar installed capacities of nuclear (19 cf. 16 GW), CCS (8 cf.
13 GW) and renewables (128 cf. 106 GW) in 2050 (DECC, 2011a).
The GHG emission targets in Scenario 80% allow a relatively modest
rate of expansion of variable-output renewables as well as retention of
some fossil capacity well into the future alongside development of bio-
mass capacity. Thus, energy storage and demand-side management
(‘smart grid’) requirements are likely to be relatively low. However, as
noted in the Results and discussion section, the consequences of grid
variability are very much an ongoing area of research.
Scenario 100% assumptions. The 100% scenario describes a future in
which the UK's national GHG emission target of 80% reduction by
2050 ismet via a combination of low-carbon technologies and efﬁciency
improvements that allow reductions in demand. The GHG emission
pathway for the economy as a whole follows closely the GHG budgets
set out by the Committee on Climate Change (2008). The scenario also
operates on the widely accepted principle that an effective way to re-
duce GHG emissions is to electrify transport and heating, on the basis
that electricity is easier to decarbonise than other energy forms. This ap-
proach is also taken in the Carbon Plan and similarly requires electricity
to be virtually ‘zero-carbon’ (at the point of generation) by 2050 (DECC,
2011a). Subsequently, electricity demand increases greatly, although
this is partly offset by efﬁciency improvements. Two potential electricity
mixes have been investigated within this scenario: 100%-1 and 100%-2
(see Table 3 and Fig. 5).
In 100%-1, new nuclear build is not successful. Currently-operating
nuclear power plants shut down according to their commercial schedule
(WorldNuclear Association, 2013). GHGemission constraints in the 100%
scenario are extremely ambitious – electricity is effectively ‘zero-carbon’
Table 3
Electricity generation and emissions constraints from 2009–2070 for the different scenarios.
Sub-scenario Year Electricity
generation
(GWh)a
GHG emission
constraintsb
(Mt CO2/yr)
Contribution of each technology to electricity mix (GWh)
Coal
(subcritical)
Gas
(CCGT)
Nuclear
(PWR)
Wind
(offshore)
Solar PV Biomass
(large-scale wood)
Biomass
(large-scale Miscanthus)
Coal CCS
Reference 2009 375,663 n/a 110,533 170,104 73,012 9831 21 6081 6081 0
65%-1 2020 336,441 176.1 114,368 173,233 27,312 10,091 1346 5046 5046 0
2035 376,540 148.0 79,113 186,858 8852 33,906 7535 5651 5651 48,975
2050 407,734 74.6 16,314 134,592 8852 64,441 12,236 6118 6118 159,063
2070 455,539 43.4 9111 50,109 0 100,218 31,888 6833 6833 250,546
65%-2 2020 336,254 176.1 107,640 168,188 39,234 10,091 1009 5046 5046 0
2035 376,814 148.0 86,648 147,490 68,461 22,604 5651 7911 7911 30,138
2050 407,764 74.6 32,628 93,807 116,148 40,785 12,236 11,216 11,216 89,728
2070 455,521 43.4 13,666 63,775 137,100 91,108 36,443 11,161 11,161 91,108
80% 2020 352,463 155.0 73,991 191,672 39,234 31,711 3523 6166 6166 0
2035 383,942 98.8 57,207 115,182 84,853 72,949 11,518 11,518 11,518 19,197
2050 535,285 42.5 10,702 74,916 148,932 165,886 53,512 19,264 19,264 42,809
2070 483,491 5.1 0 4837 140,081 174,123 77,388 21,765 21,765 43,531
100%-1 2020 352,345 144.1 81,038 176,170 27,312 38,757 3523 7928 7928 9689
2035 383,961 21.6 0 38,394 8852 145,897 76,788 18,621 18,621 76,788
2050 534,870 0.2 0 0 8852 208,695 181,939 66,622 66,622 2140
2070 483,676 0.1 0 0 0 198,307 198,307 43,047 43,047 967
100%-2 2020 352,406 144.1 81,038 162,076 51,156 31,711 3523 6166 6166 10,570
2035 383,901 21.6 3839 42,233 161,600 95,985 26,492 15,358 15,358 23,036
2050 535,159 0.2 0 0 251,013 160,535 67,960 26,756 26,756 2140
2070 483,515 0.1 0 0 242,161 125,756 67,231 24,184 24,184 0
a Both 65% sub-scenarios share the same electricity growth path, whilst 80%, 100%-1 and 100%-2 follow a different path. The actual generationwithin each growth proﬁle varies by b±0.1%
due to rounding in the calculations.
b Direct CO2 emissions limits that cannot be exceeded in order to meet the emission targets speciﬁed for each time period in different scenarios.
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Fig. 5. Contribution of different sources to the electricity mix from 2009 to 2070 for different scenarios.
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CO2 (75–92 g CO2/kWh; see Results and discussion section) despite the
carbon capture. Consequently, coal CCS follows a fast roll-out period
and an even faster period of retirement or mothballing. Use of coal CCS
peaks by 2035, at which point it provides 20% of electricity, equivalent
to around 17 GW capacity, virtually all of which must then come ofﬂine
between 2035 and 2050 to meet the GHG emission targets. As a result,
this sub-scenario relies almost entirely on renewables, which provide
98% of electricity (524 TWh) by 2050. It is assumed that biomass, peaking
at 25% of supply in 2050, is the primary means of matching supply to
demand (load-following) given the extreme levels of variable-output re-
newable capacity, thus biomass plants have a capacity factor of only 50%.
However, even with biomass, huge amounts of cheap energy storage
would be required to make grid management tenable. Moreover, solar
and wind power expand to extreme levels: for instance, about 265 GW
of solar PV capacity is needed by 2070, equivalent to 88 million residen-
tial installations at typical current sizes. This is more than three times the
current number of households in the UK (ONS, 2012). Similarly, at its
peak in 2050, installed wind power capacity is equivalent to more than
12,000 of the largest turbines currently available. As for biomass, the as-
sumption of a 50:50 split between wood and Miscanthus pellets leads
to demand in 2050 of about 35 million tonnes of wood pellets and
38 million tonnes ofMiscanthus pellets (the difference being due to calo-
riﬁc value). The Miscanthus pellets alone would require around
2.5 million ha of agricultural land: an area larger than Wales. For these
reasons, this sub-scenario is perhaps unrealistic. Nevertheless, it is still
considered here as an extreme case to explore what may be needed for
a complete decarbonisation of the electricity sector and the possible sus-
tainability implications.
In 100%-2, both new nuclear and coal CCS become a commercial re-
ality. As in 100%-1, aggressive GHG emission constraints mean that coal
CCS cannot play a major role. As a result, nuclear power is assumed to
dominate the market, ultimately providing 50% of electricity by 2070
(see Fig. 5). Nuclear growth rates are therefore ambitious, albeit more
realistically so: 3.2 GW come online by 2020, equivalent to the twin
EPR plant planned at Hinkley Point by EDF Energy (World Nuclear
Association, 2013), followed by another 17.3 GW by 2035 and a further
12GWby2050, afterwhich nomore newnuclear capacity is required as
efﬁciency improvements decrease electricity demand. Thus, the maxi-
mum build rate is around 1.2 GW/year between 2020 and 2035, which
is easily within the range suggested by the Carbon Plan (DECC, 2011a).
The recently published UK Nuclear Fission Technology Roadmap (NNL,
2012) also exceeds the demands of this scenario, with about 7.5 GW
extra nuclear (LWR) capacity by 2050 in its ‘expansion’ scenario (40 vs
32.5 GW).
It is assumed in 100%-2 that around 2 GW of coal CCS is installed by
2020, providing 3% of electricity. This increases to 6% by 2035, but then
rapidly declines in order to meet GHG emission targets: by 2050, coal
CCS cannot generate more than 0.4% of electricity, meaning installed
capacity has to decline from over 4 GW in 2035 to around 400 MW in
2050. This is less than even the least CCS-intensive scenario in the Carbon
Plan (‘Higher nuclear; less energy efﬁciency’), which assumes 2 GW in
2050 (DECC, 2011a).
Solar installation continues at a pace similar to today's until 2020,
after which it accelerates, eventually providing 14% of electricity in
2070. This represents an installed capacity of approximately 90 GW,
equivalent to around 30million residential installations at today's typical
sizes (although as mentioned previously, PV efﬁciency gains will allow
greater capacity per unit area, reducing the number of installations re-
quired). Wind power peaks in 2050 at 30% of electricity, representing
an installed capacity of about 50 GW. Given current plans to build
33 GW in the next 10–15 years (The Crown Estate, 2014), that level is
not unrealistic. Biomass does not reach the same levels as in 100%-1,
peaking at 10% of supply (about 12 GW in 2050), and mainly provides
load-following. With over 40% of power coming from wind and solar,
it is also anticipated that nuclear plants will vary output to an extentin order to minimise the need for energy storage and demand-side
management.
Reference electricity mix
To provide context and enable comparison with future scenarios,
sustainability assessment of the present electricity mix, here taken to
correspond to the year 2009, has also been carried out. For these
purposes, it has been necessary to adapt the actual electricity mix in
that year to be able to compare like for like, as some of the present tech-
nologies are not considered in the future scenarios. The ﬁrst and most
signiﬁcant adaptation is related to nuclear power which in 2009 gener-
ated 18.4% of electricity (BERR, 2010). Of this, Magnox and advanced
gas-cooled reactors (AGR) accounted for an estimated 16% and PWR for
the remaining 2.4%. Since all AGRs and Magnox reactors are scheduled
to close down by 2023, they are not considered in the future scenarios.
They will be replaced by PWRs (and perhaps BWRs) (World Nuclear
Association, 2013) which feature in the future scenarios. Therefore, the
sustainability impacts from nuclear power in 2009 are assumed to be
equal to those of PWR to enable like-for-like comparisons between the
present situation and future scenarios.
A further adaptation of the electricity mix is with respect to wind
which contributed 2% in 2009, the majority of which was from onshore
installations. Since the growth of onshorewind is expected to slowpost-
2015 owing to limited availability of suitable sites (DECC, 2011d), future
development of wind electricity will be mainly offshore, particularly
post-2020. Thus, onshorewind is not considered in the future scenarios.
The electricity generated by onshore wind in 2009 has been modelled
using data for offshore wind owing to the aforementioned lack of data
for onshore wind. The remaining technologies contributing to the elec-
tricity mix in 2009 were hydro (2.4%) and oil (1.2%). As they will not
play a considerable role in future electricity mixes (owing to a limited
resource (Committee on Climate Change, 2011) and emissions restric-
tions, respectively), they are not considered in the future scenarios
and have been omitted from the 2009 mix. However, to keep to the
original amount of electricity generated in that year, the contributions
of the technologies that are considered in this work have been scaled
up proportionally, giving the adapted mix in 2009 shown in Table 4.
As can be seen, the differences between the original and adapted elec-
tricitymix are relativelyminor but provide a better basis for comparison
between the present and future scenarios.
The following section describes the data and assumptions used to
project the characteristics of the analysed technologies out to 2070.
Technology data sources and assumptions
As mentioned previously, eight electricity generation options are
considered in thiswork (see Table 3 andTable 5). These have been chosen
because they are currently considered as the most promising options for
the future UK electricity mix (UKERC, 2009; DECC, 2011a). The capacities
consideredhere are given in Table 5; theyhave been chosen to correspon-
dent to current standard capacity sizes but also based on availability of life
cycle inventory data. Note that, whilst many coal and gas plants have
greater capacities than those stated, they are normally modular designs
consisting of units of similar capacity to those chosen so that the assump-
tions are still appropriate. Except for coal CCS, technologies which are
currently beingdevelopedbut arenot commercially available arenot con-
sidered due to lack of data. This is one of the limitations of this study.
Other limitations include uncertainty of technological development and
future costs of immature technologies such as wind and PV over time
and life cycle data for future technologies. Similar limitations are also in-
herent in most previous studies (Tyndall Centre, 2005; DECC, 2011a;
Ekins et al., 2013). Further limitations related to speciﬁc assumptions
are discussed in the text below.
Coal (subcritical pulverised), natural gas (CCGT) and nuclear power
(PWR, once-through cycle) are relatively mature technologies so that
Table 4
Electricity mix in 2009 compared to the mix adapted for the purposes of this work.
Electricity source Original electricity
mix in 2009
Adapted electricity
mix in 2009
Gas 44.6 45.3
Coal 27.9 29.4
Nuclear 18.4 19.4
Oil 1.2 0
Hydro 2.4 0
Biomass 3.1 3.2
Wind 2.5 2.6
Total 100 100
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modest. Moreover, any changes that do occur will take time to affect
the electricity mix as old plants must ﬁrst reach the ends of their lives.
Therefore, as discussed in the following sections, their characteristics
in future time periods are based on those reported by Stamford and
Azapagic (2012).
The UK is the current world leader in offshorewind installed capacity
(3653 MW at the time of writing, representing about half of the world-
wide total) (RenewableUK, 2013), whilst the global capacity of solar PV
is speculated to increase more than 100-fold between 2010 and 2050
(IEA, 2010). Given the immaturity and accelerating uptake of these
two technologies, major improvements can be expected in themedium
term. Their assumed future characteristics are discussed below.
There are no large-scale coal CCS plants currently operating, but any
new coal plant proposed in the UK must have CCS ﬁtted to at least
300 MW of its capacity (DECC, 2011b); development of CCS is also sup-
ported by the government's plans to demonstrate the technology before
2020, including £1 billion of capital subsidy (DECC, 2010). Illustrative
ﬁgures for coal CCS have therefore also been added to the analysis, as
described in Table 6 and in Supplementary information.
Finally, emissions restrictions in the LCPD have prompted several
large coal plants to plan conversion to 100% biomass combustion:
RWE npower's Tilbury plant (750MW) converted to 100%wood pellets
in 2011, followed by E.On's Ironbridge (600MW) in 2013; Drax (4 GW)
has also proposed full conversion (Selby Times 4 August, 2012), as has
Eggborough (1.96 GW) (Webb 5 November, 2012). Thus, as part of
this analysis, large-scale combustion of wood andMiscanthus pellets in
converted coal plants has been assessed, as described in Supplementary
information.
The key assumptions for each technology are summarised in Table 6
and discussed in detail in Supplementary information.Results and discussion
This section presents and compares the sustainability impacts of the
ﬁve electricity scenarios. The results are discussed in turn for each sus-
tainability indicator deﬁned in Table 1, expressed per unit of electricity
generated. For full results, including the impacts per year, see Supple-
mentary Information.Table 5
Size and type of electricity plants considered in the scenarios.
Electricity source Plant size and type
Coal 460 MW subcritical pulverised plant
Coal CCS 500 MW power plant
Natural gas 400 MW combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT)
Nuclear 970 MW pressurised water reactor (PWR)
Solar PV 3 kWp
Wind 3 MW and 5 MW offshore turbines
Biomass 500 MW plant ﬁred with wood and MiscanthusTechno-economic sustainability assessment
Capacity and availability factors
As shown in Fig. 6a, the total system capacity factor decreases in all
scenarios. This is mainly due to the increased adoption of wind and PV
which, being variable in output, have low capacity factors. This is partic-
ularly apparent in sub-scenario 100%-1 which, by 2070, derives most
(82%) of its electricity from wind and PV. As a result, it has the lowest
capacity factor of the scenarios, at 33% compared to 65% in 2009.
Availability factors show the opposite trend (Fig. 6b): increased re-
newable penetration brings higher values, increasing from 88% in the
present to 94% in 2070 in the highest case (100%-1). This means slightly
fewer unscheduled production outages would be expected in future,
particularly in 100%-1. However, this does not necessarily mean that
supply to consumers would bemore reliable: such high levels of renew-
ables mean that output would be highly variable and grid management
would be far beyond what is currently achievable, necessitating enor-
mous energy storage schemes. This would of course increase the cost
of electricity to consumers, but the extent of this increase is not currently
known (and therefore cannot be quantiﬁed here).
Technical and economic dispatchability
In all scenarios, dispatchability of the electricity mix as a whole is
lower than in the present (Fig. 6c & d). Sub-scenario 100%-1 is the
worst in this respect, with technical dispatchability gradually deteriorat-
ing from the summed rank of 7.7 in 2009 to 14.0 in 2070, and economic
dispatchability from 42 to 71 (lower scores being preferable in both
cases). This is because the most dispatchable technologies of those
assessed are coal, gas and biomass power, each having relatively low cap-
ital costs and high load-following ability (Stamford and Azapagic, 2012).
As GHG emission targets force the replacement of fossil capacity, it thus
becomes more difﬁcult to match supply to demand.
Wind and solar power in particular are inherently non-dispatchable
as output cannot be controlled. Nuclear power, on the other hand, is ca-
pable of following load to an extent, but this depends on the price incen-
tive: high electricity sale prices at times of peak demand would be
necessary to incentivise nuclear plant owners to reduce output at
other times. Although biomass would be used to follow load in all the
low-carbon scenarios, this is unlikely to be sufﬁcient in scenarios with
high penetration of wind and PV. Thus, in 80% and 100%-2, nuclear
power might also load-follow (within limits). This in turn will affect
other aspects, such as cost. However, so will the other grid balancing
services that will likely be necessary (such as energy storage), but this
is an ongoing area of research in which technological requirements in
the long term are impossible to predict, thus impacts cannot yet be
accounted for.
Lifetime of global fuel reserves
The effective life of fuel reserves for electricity generation correlates
positively with renewables penetration because they are fuel-free and
have reserve lifetimes that are essentially inﬁnite, being only constrained
by local availability of natural resources (sunlight, wind, etc.). This is seen
in sub-scenario 100%-1 (Fig. 6e) which has a reserve lifetime noticeably
higher than all other scenarios from the mid-2020s onward, reaching
about 1000 years by 2070 (which is the artiﬁcial cap set on fuel lifetime
for renewables to enable calculation). The result is much lower in
100%-2 (509 years by 2070) due to nuclear power providing 50% of elec-
tricity: at current consumption rates, identiﬁed economically exploitable
uranium reserves will only last another 20 years by 2070 (to 2090).
However, as discussed in Supplementary information, the quantiﬁcation
of future fuel reserve lifetimes is not very robust: the lifetime of uranium
reserves is very likely to increase substantially in future due to the rela-
tively low level of exploration in recent decades and the increasing possi-
bility of extraction from alternative sources such as phosphates and, at
higher prices, sea water. The global reserve of uranium in phosphates is
estimated at 9 to 22 Mt U (World Nuclear Association, 2012); if this is
Table 6
Key assumptions for each technology from 2009 to 2070.
Coal Coal CCS Natural gas Nuclear Solar PV Offshore wind Biomass
Capacity factor 62% 62% 62% 85% 8.6% 30% in 2009 increasing to 50%
from 2035 onward.
47.1%
Availability factor 87% 87% 79% 89% 96% 81% in 2009; 95% from 2020
onward.
87%
Technical
dispatchability
Based on data from current plants. Assumed the same as coal. Based on data
from current
plants.
Based on current
plants in 2009 and
new plants from 2020
onward.
Worst rank for every parameter. Worst rank for every
parameter.
Assumed the same as coal.
Lifetime of
fuel reserves
All fossil fuels and uranium assumed to decline linearly from 2009 to 2070. Inﬁnite. Capped at 1000 yrs
to enable calculation.
Inﬁnite. Capped at 1000 yrs
to enable calculation.
Assumed inﬁnite (depends on
global demand). Capped at
1000 yrs to enable calculation.
Levelised costs Carbon tax/cost excluded. First-of-a-kind premium
included in 2009; excluded from
2020. Carbon tax/cost excluded.
Costs decline from 2009 to 2070
with 3.5% (PC) and 4.9% (IGCC)
learning rate.
Carbon tax/cost
excluded.
First-of-a-kind
premium included in
2009; excluded from
2020 onward.
Costs decline from 2009 to 2070
with an 18% learning rate.
Round 2 projects in 2009.
Round 3 projects begin 2020.
Costs decline with a 12%
learning rate.
Assumes conversion from coal
to biomass in 2009. FGD and
SCR gradually added by 2050.
Recyclability of
input materials
Assumes all major materials are 100% recyclable apart from concrete which is calculated to be 79% recyclable (when used as aggregate in new concrete). For nuclear plants, 1.44% of materials deemed too
contaminated to recycle.
Life cycle
assessment
modelling
assumptions
Subcritical pulverised coal.
Average plant size 460 MW,
efﬁciency 36%. Flue gas
desulphurisation (90% SO2
captured) and selective catalytic
reduction (79% NOx captured).
Mixed dataset of 500 MW plants.
Post-combustion CCS in 2020,
incorporating oxyfuel
combustion plants from 2035
onward.
400 MW CCGT,
efﬁciency
57.5%. North
Sea gas
comprises 90%
of fuel, LNG
10%.
Pressurised water
reactor, 1000 MW
class. Once-through
fuel cycle (no
reprocessing).
Assumes constant mix of
technologies throughout the
period. All panels 3 kWp.
Efﬁciencies improve over time (e.g.
multi-Si panel progresses from
13.2% in 2009 to 25% by 2050)
3 MW turbines in 2009
increasing to 4 MW in 2035
and 5 MW from 2050.
Capacity factors increase
from 30% in 2009 to 40% in
2020 and 50% by 2035.
500 MW plant, efﬁciency
increases from 35% in 2009 to
40% from 2050. Wood is 50%
waste, 50% virgin. Half of the
Miscanthus requires fertilisers,
and half does not.
Employment
(direct + indirect)
Assumed constant
throughout time period.
Based on coal: 10% higher
throughout life cycle; 25% in fuel
supply stages. Employment
declines to 2070 using the same
learning rate as in levelised cost
calculations.
Assumed
constant
throughout
time period.
Assumed constant
throughout time
period.
Employment declines to 2070
using the same learning rate as in
levelised cost calculations.
Employment declines to
2070 using the same learning
rate as in levelised cost
calculations.
Assumed constant throughout
time period (apart from
adjustments for increased
power plant efﬁciency).
Worker injuries Sector-speciﬁc injury rates in the present day extrapolated to 2070 based on historical trend.
Fatalities due to
large accidents
– – – – – – Data only available for wood
CHP as opposed to large-scale
power plants.
Diversity of fuel
supply mix
– – – – – – Data for wood are
representative of pellets and
briquettes. AllMiscanthus
assumed to be indigenous.
Fuel storage
capabilities
(energy density)
Net energy density of steam coal
used in the UK = 24.9 GJ/t.
Density of coal = 850 kg/m3.
Net energy density of steam coal
used in the UK = 24.9 GJ/t. Density
of coal = 850 kg/m3.
Net energy
density of
natural gas used
in the
UK = 0.0358
GJ/m3.
Fuel assembly design
for an Areva EPR is
used. Burn-up of
50 GWd/tU assumed
in order to give
conservative results.
Fuel storage not possible. Fuel storage not possible. Wood pellet value taken from
ecoinvent (12.164 GJ/m3).
Miscanthus calculated from
composition (15.651 GJ/t,
660 kg/m3).
Nuclear
proliferation
Assumes current once-through cycle policy is maintained throughout time period.
Volume of
radioactive waste
to be stored
Assumes average value for Areva EPR andWestinghouse AP1000. Conservatively assumes high burn-up (65 GWd/tU), therefore waste is more radioactive. Waste is packaged in bentonite.
Volume of liquid
CO2 to be stored
Assumes 0.79 kg CO2/kWh captured and injected at a pressure of 11 Mpa (supercritical CO2 density = 950 kg/m3).
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Fig. 6. Techno-economic sustainability of different scenarios from 2009–2070, expressed per unit of electricity generated. [For deﬁnition of indicators, see Table 1.]
203L. Stamford, A. Azapagic / Energy for Sustainable Development 23 (2014) 194–211included in the estimate, uranium reserve lifetime increases by about
600 years (NEA, 2007), meaning the overall result for 100%-2 would
come closer to that of 100%-1.Moreover, all sub-scenarios showa gradual
improvement over the current value (138 years), culminating in a mini-
mum 150% improvement by 2070.
Ratio of plant ﬂexibility and operation lifetime
As shown in Fig. 6f, all future scenarios are less resistant to technolog-
ical lock-in than the present-day electricity mix. This is primarily due to
the inability of solar, wind and nuclear power (at least in terms of
PWRs) to provide these services, together with the long 60 year lifetime
of nuclear plants. Some scenarios enable a slight improvement in the
short term (2020) owing to expansion of gas power but, as gas is
constrained tomeet GHGemission targets, lock-in resistance deteriorates
in all cases, falling from 10.7 yrs−1 in 2009 to 2.4 yrs−1 in the worst case
(100%-2) by 2070.
Time to start up
Construction times are quite similar in all sub-scenarios apart from
100%-1 which is preferable in this respect due to its extreme use of
solar power (Fig. 6g): solar installations are modular and, in the case
of small systems, can normally be completed in 2–3 days, giving
100%-1 an average time to plant start-up of 7.0 months in 2070 (com-
pared to 47.3 months in 2009). Interest accrued during construction is
therefore negligible and, from the system management perspective,installed capacity on the grid can be increased quickly according to
changes in national electricity consumption.
Capital, operational, fuel and total costs
Fig. 6h illustrates the trend towards capital-intensive technologies in
all future scenarios. This is because low-carbon technologies tend to have
high upfront costs and low operating costs: around three quarters of the
levelised cost of nuclear power, for example, is capital expenditure,
whilst the corresponding ﬁgures for wind and solar are around 75%
and 94%, respectively. This means that future electricity mixes have
lower marginal costs and are inherently less dispatchable, as discussed
above. Moreover, it means that interest accrued during construction be-
comes a more important feature of economic viability in the future, as
construction times will need to be as short and as ﬁxed as possible to
avoid signiﬁcant cost overruns. This illustrates the importance of initia-
tives such as the Green Investment Bankwhich will specialise in lending
to ‘green’ projects where problems with availability of capital would
otherwise inhibit development (Vivid Economics and McKinsey & Co.,
2011).
The results suggest that the total cost of electricity will increase rela-
tive to the present in all cases, even taking into account technological
learning rates (see Fig. 6k). Of the scenarios in which GHG emission
targets are met, 100%-2 is the cheapest option by 2070, being only 14%
more expensive than the current electricity mix per unit of electricity
generated (8.7 cf. 7.6 pence/kWh). In 100%-1, which meets the emission
204 L. Stamford, A. Azapagic / Energy for Sustainable Development 23 (2014) 194–211targets without nuclear power, total cost is much higher than the other
scenarios in every time period from 2020 onwards, with a ﬁnal cost in
2070 of 10.95 pence/kWh (43% higher than 2009). Scenario 100%-2 is
comparable in terms of overall cost to 65%-2 and 80% despite having con-
siderably lower GHG emissions and is in fact cheaper than 65%-1. This is
because nuclear power, the biggest energy source in 100%-2 by 2070, is
expected to be cheaper than coal CCS in that time period. However,
Fig. 6k also demonstrates the fact that meeting GHG emission targets
(100%-1 and -2) will likely increase costs very rapidly prior to 2035,
followed by a steady reduction thereafter as the cost of renewables de-
clines. In contrast, the cost of other scenarios increases more gradually
but without the later reduction.
It should be noted that the costs shown here exclude any system
costs incurred due to increased energy storage requirements, balancing
mechanisms and output restrictions that might be necessary in
renewable-intensive scenarios. The magnitude of this extra cost is not
currently known, but the topic is being assessed by the National Grid
(2011). It is therefore likely that total costs will increase by more than
the percentages estimated here, particularly in sub-scenarios 80% and
100%-1 which rely heavily on the variable output of wind power.
Additionally, it is important to bear inmind that electricity generation
cost is not the same as cost to the consumer: the latter is generally much
higher. The difference reﬂects other costs incurred by utility companies,
such as administration, research anddevelopment, network transmission
fees and proﬁt. As a result, an increase in generation cost of x% would0.84
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Fig. 7. Environmental sustainability of different scenarios from 2009–2070, expresprobably cause an increase in domestic electricity bills that is lower
than x%.
Fuel price sensitivity
Following a brief increase in fuel price sensitivity in 2020 (mainly
because of increased gas usage), all scenarios become less sensitive
thereafter. In sub-scenarios 80%, 100%-1 and 100%-2, sensitivity to fuel
price volatility is at least two-thirds lower than in today's energy mix
by 2070 (Fig. 6l). Even in 65%-1 and 65%-2, which rely more on fossil
fuel generation, overall sensitivity gradually decreases to 23% and 22%,
respectively, compared to the 2009 value of 45%. As a result, electricity
prices are less exposed to volatile international fuel markets, meaning
prices paid by consumers should bemore stable (despite being higher).
This is primarily a result of decreased reliance on natural gas.
Environmental sustainability
The environmental sustainability of the scenarios is presented in
Fig. 7 and discussed below.
Recyclability of input materials
The average recyclability of materials in future electricity mixes is
likely to be slightly higher than is the case today: in the scenarios
assessed here, the 2009 value of 86.4% increases to 88.3–96.8% by
2070 (Fig. 7a). This is mainly due to the increasing adoption of wind65%-1
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205L. Stamford, A. Azapagic / Energy for Sustainable Development 23 (2014) 194–211(99.4% recyclable) and solar PV (99.8% recyclable) and reﬂects the fact
that renewable technologies tend to use proportionally more metal
and less concrete, the latter currently being the main limiting factor in
recyclability (Stamford and Azapagic, 2012). However, as the materials
used in the present-day mix are already highly recyclable (86%), im-
provements to actual recycling rates are likely to be more signiﬁcant
than improvements in potential recyclability. Moreover, because the
environmental impacts of wind and solar power are almost entirely
due to the manufacturing stage, recycling can dramatically improve all
life cycle impacts (Stamford and Azapagic, 2012). As a result, the beneﬁts
of end-of-life recycling increase as the electricity mix becomes more
reliant on renewables.
Freshwater aquatic eco-toxicity potential (FAETP)
FAETP decreases in all scenarios, falling from a present-day value
of about 34.6 Mt DCB eq./yr (92 g/kWh) to a range of 8.3 to
13.5 Mt DCB eq./yr (18.1–27.8 g/kWh) by 2070 (Fig. 7b). The lowest
value is found in sub-scenario 65%-1 which is less carbon constrained
than the 80% and 100% scenarios and relies more heavily on coal CCS
(55% by 2070). Despite this, it should not be concluded that coal CCS re-
duces FAETP: as mentioned in Supplementary information, the FAETP
for coal CCS is probably underestimated, thus the FAETP of 65%-1 as a
whole is underestimated. Over 90% of the present-day FAETP of electric-
ity production is caused by coal power, primarily due to emissions of
heavymetals like nickel and berylliumduring coal extraction. It is likely,
therefore, that anymove away fromcoal as a fuel sourcewill be beneﬁcial
in terms of FAETP. Moreover, the 100%-1 and 100%-2 sub-scenarios
achieve a more rapid decrease in FAETP than the others, and therefore a
lower cumulative impact by 2070, despite emissions in the ﬁnal year
being slightly higher than for the other options.
Of the low-carbon technologyoptions, solar PVhas thehighest impact.
For this reason, the 2070 FAETP of 100%-1, the extremely renewables-
intensive sub-scenario, is a quarter greater than that of its nuclear-
intensive alternative, 100%-2.
Marine aquatic eco-toxicity potential (MAETP)
Emissions of hydrogen ﬂuoride from coal and coal CCS power plants
are largely responsible for MAETP. This impact is highest for 65%-1
(Fig. 7c) which in 2070 emits 262 kg DCB eq./kWh (119 Gt DCB-
equivalent per year). In contrast, the best scenario in terms of MAETP
is 100%-2, emitting only 54 kg DCB eq./kWh (26 Gt DCB eq./yr) in
2070 and achieving the lowest MAETP from 2035 onwards owing to
the avoidance of coal-ﬁred generation.
Global warming potential (GWP)
As shown in Fig. 7d, the GWP of annual electricity production
reduces markedly in all scenarios. From an estimated 184 Mt CO2 eq.
in 2009, by 2070 the total GWP ranges from 10.5 Mt in 100%-2 to
51.4 Mt in 65%-1. The 100%-2 sub-scenario therefore represents a re-
duction of 94% over the present despite total electricity demand grow-
ing from 376 to 484 TWh per year. Per kilowatt-hour, even the least
ambitious scenarios (65%-1 and 65%-2) represent a reduction of around
75% over the present-day value of 490 g CO2 eq./kWh. It should be
noted that current policy addresses only GHG emissions at the point
of generation, aiming for virtually ‘zero-carbon’ electricity by 2050
(DECC, 2011a). Both 100%-1 and 100%-2 are in line with this goal,
each emitting just 0.3 g CO2/kWh (0.174 Mt CO2 annually) in 2050 in
direct GHG emissions. However, when the whole life cycle is consid-
ered, the 2070 mix of 100%-1 has a carbon footprint twice that of
100%-2 (41 vs 22 g CO2 eq./kWh). This is due to 100%-1 relying more
heavily on solar PV and biomass which, even in 2070, have a GWP of
around 50 and 100 g CO2 eq./kWh, respectively, compared to 4.7 g for
wind and 6.2 g for nuclear power (see Supplementary information).
The 80% sub-scenario in fact has a lower GWP in 2070 than the 100%-1
sub-scenario (32 vs 41 g CO2 eq./kWh) owing to its greater use of nuclear
power. This suggests that it is possible to achieve a cheaper electricitymix(see Fig. 6k)with lower climate change impacts by considering thewhole
life cycle rather than only direct emissions.
As mentioned above, it is notable that, by 2070, solar PV has a GWP
higher than the grid average: this work estimates the GWP of solar PV
at around 49 g CO2 eq./kWh in 2050–2070. Lower estimates exist in
literature; for example, NEEDS (Schenler et al., 2008) estimate 3.6–
11 g CO2 eq./kWh under German conditions. However, such estimates
apply to large, non-residential installations (420–46,600 kWp in
NEEDS cf. 3 kWp here), meaning lower emissions can be expected
owing to the economies of scale (via sharing of components and other
resources). Additionally, the relatively low levels of insolation in the
UK lead to reduced capacity factors. Nevertheless, in order to improve
conﬁdence in this area, further work on future thin-ﬁlm solar technolo-
gies under UK conditions is recommended.
This analysis also suggest that coal CCS can only have a limited role
in decarbonising the UK's electricity supply. In 100%-1 and 100%-2,
GHG emission constraints are such that it can provide a maximum of
about 0.5% of electricity by 2050. This raises serious problems in that
any substantial deployment of coal CCS pre-2050 would likely require
mothballing or decommissioning of that capacity before the end of its
lifetime. Even in the less ambitious 80% scenario – which would likely
involve missing the UK's national GHG emission targets – coal CCS
only provides about 8% of electricity from 2050 onwards, corresponding
to roughly 8GW installed capacity. This calls into question the economic
case for investing in new coal CCS, and its associated infrastructure, on a
large scale.
Ozone layer depletion potential (ODP)
ODP improves relative to the present in all scenarios, particularly in
80% and 100%-2 (Fig. 7e). The relatively high ODP of 100%-1 in 2070
(2.53 t CFC-11 eq./yr or 5.22 μg/kWh) is mainly due to production
and use of tetraﬂuoroethylene in the solar PV life cycle (Stamford and
Azapagic, 2012). However, even this level of ozone layer depletion is
10% lower than today's. Moreover, by 2070 themix of solar PV technol-
ogies will likely include a greater contribution from thin-ﬁlm laminates
(as opposed to panels), which tend to have lower ODP values, meaning
the ﬁgure of 2.53 t is an overestimate. The best scenario from the ODP
perspective is 100%-2 with an emission rate of 2.4 μg CFC-11 eq./kWh.
As shown in Fig. 7e, 100%-2 also results in the fastest reduction in ODP
with the lowest impact throughout the time period.
Acidiﬁcation potential (AP)
Decreased acidiﬁcation potential is seen in all scenarios compared to
the present, with sub-scenario 100%-2 being the preferred outcome,
reducing acid gas emissions by 160,000 t SO2-equivalent per year
relative to today: a reduction of 62%. The 65%-1 sub-scenario has the
highest AP values in 2070 due to extensive use of coal CCS; however,
at 0.48 g SO2 eq./kWh, it still represents a reduction of 31% over the
2009 value of 0.69 g/kWh (Fig. 7f).
Eutrophication potential (EP)
All scenarios show a reduction in annual eutrophication of at least
two-thirds relative to today's electricity supply (Fig. 7g). In 2070, the
renewables-intensive 100%-1 sub-scenario is the worst in terms of
EP, emitting 0.15 g PO43− eq./kWh (73.3 kt PO43− eq. per year). The
80% and 100%-2 scenarios are the best options, both emitting less than
~0.08 g PO43− eq./kWh (41 kt PO43− eq. per year) compared to the pres-
ent dayﬁgure of 0.585 g PO43− eq./kWh (220 kt/yr). However, it is likely
that 100%-2 would in fact be markedly better than 80% in terms of EP:
coal CCS provides about 9% of electricity by 2070 in the 80% scenario
and, as discussed in Supplementary information, its EP results are prob-
ably underestimated. In contrast, there is no coal CCS by2070 in 100%-2.
Photochemical oxidant creation potential (POCP)
Scenarios 100%-2 and 80% are the best options for this impact,
with 2070 results of 11.7 and 14.1 kt C2H4 eq./yr, or 24 and
206 L. Stamford, A. Azapagic / Energy for Sustainable Development 23 (2014) 194–21129mg C2H4 eq./kWh, respectively (Fig. 7h). Similar tomost other en-
vironmental impacts, 100%-2 also achieves the fastest reduction in emis-
sions. Sub-scenario 65%-1 provides the least improvement over the
present with a result of 52 mg C2H4 eq./kWh. Coupled with increased
electricity demand, this leads to an annual impact of 23.5 kt C2H4 eq./yr,
which is in fact slightly higher (~2%) than in 2009. This is due to high
emissions of non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC),
methane, sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides in the coal CCS life cycle.
Land occupation
By far the biggest inﬂuence on land occupation is the proportion of
power generated from biomass. The peak in biomass demand is 2050
in sub-scenario 100%-1 (Fig. 7i), at which point wood and Miscanthus
each provide 12.45% of electricity (i.e. 24.9% in total). In the case of
Miscanthus, this level of demand would require about 2.5 million ha of
agricultural land for crop cultivation. This study assumes that 75% of
Miscanthus is UK-grown, meaning about 1.88 million ha is needed do-
mestically. England is thought to have about 3 million ha of grade 4 or
5 agricultural land (‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ grades, which are therefore
less likely to interfere with food production) (RCEP, 2004), meaning
this level ofMiscanthus deployment is technically possible, albeit rather
extreme.
However, even in scenarios lackingbiomass power, landuse tends to
increase relative to 2009. This is due to the coal CCS life cycle: large
volumes of coal are required and, consequently, a large area of land
must be devoted to mining. It should be noted that, in terms of public
acceptability, larger areas of land devoted to growing energy crops
may be preferable to smaller areas of land devoted tomining (although
mining areas are likely to be outside the UK, whereas energy crop farms
are not, making this an issue of conﬂict between national and interna-
tional impact).
Terrestrial eco-toxicity potential (TETP)
In all scenarios, TETP increases over the coming decades. However,
this is mainly due to an increase in electricity demand rather than an
increase in emissions per unit output. The worst scenario from this
perspective is the renewables-intensive option, 100%-1, with total
emissions 87% higher than in 2009 (680 vs 363 kt DCB eq./yr) and
emissions per kilowatt-hour 45% higher than the present (1.41 vs
0.97 g DCB eq./kWh); see Fig. 7j. Half of this impact is due toMiscanthus
despite the fact that it only comprises 9% of the mix by 2070: the cause
is the common disposal option for biomass ash of spreading on farm-
land as a low-grade fertiliser and liming agent, which has the unintend-
ed side-effect of increasing heavy metal contamination in agricultural
soils. In this study, 25% of ash is assumed to be disposed of by agricultur-
al spreading. Note that the metal content ofMiscanthus, and therefore
the resulting TETP of Miscanthus power, is highly variable depending
on the cultivation site.
Other contributors to the general trend of increasing TETP over the
present include the emissions of mercury to air during combustion of
coal at coal CCS power plants and heavy metal emissions in the life
cycles of nuclear, wind and solar power.
Social sustainability
The social sustainability of the scenarios is presented in Fig. 8 and
discussed below.
Direct employment
Direct employment (in plant construction, operation, maintenance
and decommissioning) increases in all scenarios (Fig. 8a), rising from
52 person-yrs/TWh in 2009 (19,600 jobs) to 84–159 person-yrs/TWh
(38,100–76,800 jobs) by 2070. Since this employment is direct, it is likely
to beneﬁt the UK. However, offshore wind and solar PV create more
direct employment than the other technologies; therefore 100%-1
(being very renewables-intensive) creates the most work. In contrast,nuclear power is less labour-intensive, meaning 100%-2 achieves the
same GHG emission targets with 30% less employment.
Total employment
The total employment estimates in Fig. 8b, which include raw
material extraction, manufacturing, construction, operation, mainte-
nance, and decommissioning, show the same increasing trend as for
direct employment. The total life cycle employment of sub-scenario
100%-1 is 226 person-yrs/TWh in 2070 (or 109,300 jobs), compared to
the 2009 ﬁgure of 123 person-yrs/TWh (46,100). The fact that the total
and direct employment ﬁgures for 100%-1 are quite similar is a reﬂection
of the fact that 80–85% of work in thewind and solar life cycles are in op-
eration and maintenance or installation. In contrast, 70% of jobs in the
coal CCS life cycle occur in the coal mining stage, meaning much of the
employment provided by 65%-2 will occur outside the UK.
Worker injuries
As shown in Fig. 8c, worker injury rates diverge greatly between
scenarios. By 2070, projected improvements in worker injury rates
(see Section S1.3.2 in Supplementary information) are balanced out by
increases in electricity demand and, in the case of 65%-1, an increase
in the proportion of relatively high-riskwork (coalmining). Throughout
the whole life cycle, about 1065 injuries per year (2.34 per TWh) are
associated with 65%-1, compared to 690 today (1.84/TWh). The best
scenario from this perspective is 100%-2, with around 510 injuries per
year and the lowest injury rates of all scenarios from the mid-2020s
onwards (Fig. 8c).
Human toxicity potential (HTP), excluding radiation
All scenarios show a decrease in HTP per unit output by 2070
(Fig. 8d). However, increases in electricity demand mean that the total
impact is similar to today's in most cases. The worst option in terms of
HTP is 100%-2, with a 2070 impact of 42.8 Mt dichlorobenzene
(DCB) eq./yr, 19% higher than in 2009, despite the impact per kilowatt-
hour being 8% lower at 89 g DCB eq./kWh. The best option appears to
be 65%-1 (27% lower than today) but its impact is likely underestimated
owing to its reliance on coal CCS and the less comprehensive background
LCA data available for that technology (as discussed in Section S1.2.2 in
Supplementary information). In the life cycle of coal without CCS, the
main contributors to theHTP are emissions of heavymetals and selenium
during coal mining, which can be expected to be equally applicable to the
coal CCS life cycle. Thus the real impact of 65%-1 could be signiﬁcantly
higher than indicated.
Total human health impacts from radiation
Nuclear power has a greater radiation-induced health impact than
other technologies. As a result, 100%-1 and 65%-1 – neither of which
has nuclear power – showa gradually declining radiation impact, ﬁnally
reaching 0.25 disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) per TWh by 2070
(Fig. 8e). Per year, this equates to 118 DALYs for 100%-1 and 127 DALYs
for 65%-1 compared to 1534 DALYs in 2009. The scenario with the
most nuclear power, 100%-2, has approximately 10.2 DALYs/TWh, or
4947 DALYs/yr by 2070 (although the annual ﬁgure peaks in 2050 at
5133 DALYs when electricity demand is higher). This impact is mainly
due to radon emissions from uranium mill tailings over a period of
thousands of years. To put this into context, road trafﬁc accidents in
the UK in 2004 are estimated to have caused 108,000 DALYs (World
Health Organisation, 2009).
Fatalities due to large accidents
As shown in Fig. 8f, large accident fatalities diverge greatly based
on the choice of scenario. Scenario 65%-1 has the highest impact at
9.87 fatalities/PWh or 4.49 per year in 2070, 41% higher than today's.
This is because 65%-1 relies heavily on coal CCS which, in 2070, is esti-
mated to cause over 50 times more fatalities per unit of electricity gen-
erated than offshore wind, solar PV or nuclear power. This is a direct
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207L. Stamford, A. Azapagic / Energy for Sustainable Development 23 (2014) 194–211result of its high coal mining requirement. The best option from this
perspective is 100%-2 owing to its use of renewables: it causes
0.085 fatalities/yr in 2070, or 0.18 fatalities/PWh. This scenario also
has the lowest impact over the entire time period.Avoidance of fossil fuel imports
The GHG emission constraints of the scenarios mean that, even
accounting for coal CCS, fossil fuel usage cannot be as high in 2070 as
in 2009. Clearly, however, scenarios 100%-1 and 100%-2 avoid the
most fossil fuel use due to 99.8% of electricity coming either from re-
newables or nuclear power in 2070. Relative to the 2009 fossil fuel
ﬂeet, this saves 0.2 tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) per MWh (Fig. 8g) or
97 Mtoe/yr. This would represent a national increase in resilience tofossil fuel price volatility. Even the less extreme 80% scenario saves
87 Mtoe/yr relative to the 2009 fossil ﬂeet.Diversity of fuel supply mix
This indicator reﬂects the resilience of national electricity production
to fuel supply disruptions, whether they are economic, technical or po-
litical. However, results here are highly tentative as future fuel supply
mixes cannot be known. Assuming that supply mixes stay the same as
in the present, resilience increases with penetration of wind and PV,
meaning 100%-1 has the highest resilience surpassing 90% in 2035 and
reaching 97% by 2070 compared to the average 2009 value of 81.8%
(Fig. 8h). However, as UK steam coal currently has a very non-diverse
fuel supply (Stamford andAzapagic, 2012), any electricitymixwith little
208 L. Stamford, A. Azapagic / Energy for Sustainable Development 23 (2014) 194–211coal or coal CCS is preferable: for example, the 80% scenario reaches 91%
in 2070 despite only 52% of electricity coming fromwind and PV. It is of
note that wood pellet combustion currently has the worst supply diver-
sity score of any technology (66.5%), owing to overreliance on Canada
and the USA. However, as a relatively new power option, its fuel supply
chain could broaden in future.
Fuel storage capabilities
The fuel storage abilities of nuclear power far exceed any other elec-
tricity source due to the extremely high energy density of nuclear fuel
(Stamford and Azapagic, 2012). Therefore it is far easier to stockpile
energy reserves in scenarios with large amounts of nuclear power.
Consequently, 100%-2 has the highest average fuel storage potential in
all time periods, reaching 5.19 PJ/m3 by 2070, 158% higher than today's
electricity mix (2.01 PJ/m3); see Fig. 8i. In contrast, it is not possible to
stockpile much fuel in sub-scenario 100%-1 as it relies greatly on wind
and PV. However, as those technologies have no fuel, the main energy
security obstacle to renewable-intensive scenarios is not fuel storage
but the difﬁculty of matching supply to demand given variable-output
generators.
Use of non-enriched uranium, reprocessing and requirements for enriched
uranium
Clearly this indicator increases proportionally with nuclear power's
contribution to the energy mix, meaning scenario 100%-2 carries the
greatest proliferation risk due to 50.1% of its electricity coming from
nuclear power stations by 2070. Its proliferation risk elevates quickly
between 2020 and 2035 as around 17 GW of new nuclear capacity is
brought online. In 2070 it is rated at 16.5 relative to today's rating of
6.4 (Fig. 8j). However, as discussed in Section S1.3.7 in Supplementary
information, if reprocessing of spent fuel occurs, the rating would
double owing to the extracted products becoming potential targets of
theft or terrorism. As noted previously, the ordinal scale used here is
simplistic and is not appropriate for the evaluation of any Generation
IV reactors that may or may not be online by 2070.
Use of abiotic resources (elements)
Depletion of elements is positively correlated with renewable
electricity output because wind and solar power have a much higher
life cycle impact than other power sources. This is demonstrated in
100%-1, in which depletion rapidly increases to 2.95 kg Sb eq./GWh
(or 1429 t Sb-eq. per year) by 2070: six and a half times the amount
in 2009 (Fig. 8k). This is due to the higher metal requirements of the re-
newables relative to their electrical output. However, end-of-life
recycling can reduce this depletion considerably. The less renewable-
intensive scenarios show a more modest increase over the present,
but depletion increases in all scenarios.
Use of abiotic resources (fossil)
The depletion of fossil resources is obviously greatest in the life
cycles of coal, coal CCS and gas power. Therefore, fossil resource deple-
tion is lowest in scenarios 100%-1 and 100%-2 (Fig. 8l) which, by 2070,
use around 0.51 and 0.26 MJ/kWh (or 246 and 127 PJ/yr), respectively.
This compares to 5.9 MJ/kWh (2200 PJ/yr) in the 2009 electricity mix,
equating to a saving of 94% for 100%-2 and 89% for 100%-1. The less
extreme 80% scenario also results in signiﬁcant improvements over
the present with a value of 1.25 MJ/kWh (603 PJ/yr). The result is that
far more fossil fuel would be available for use by future generations in
any of these three scenarios compared to business-as-usual. The con-
verse is true for the 65%-1 scenario: increased electricity demand and
widespread use of coal CCS cause total annual depletion of 3043 PJ,
38% higher than in 2009.
Volume of radioactive waste and liquid CO2 to be stored
The most nuclear-intensive scenario, 100%-2, has an operating
nuclear capacity of around 32.5 GW in 2070 producing a total of2460 m3 of radioactive waste per year requiring geological storage
(or 5.1 m3/TWh; see Fig. 8m). This is around three times as much as
the equivalent amount for 2009 (although, as noted in the Reference
electricity mix section, the 2009 ﬁgure is based on PWRs and therefore
does not accurately reﬂect the amount ofwaste produced by the current
UKnuclearﬂeet). All of the radioactivewaste productionﬁgures include
packaging and are based on a ‘once-through’ cycle in line with current
policy, in which no reprocessing of fuel occurs; if this changes in the
future, the waste produced would be much lower in volume but with
higher heat output, necessitating greater packaging space per unit
volume (NNL, 2012).
Scenario 65%-1 has the greatest contribution from coal CCS, particu-
larly from 2035 onwards, and therefore produces the most CO2 in need
of storage (Fig. 8n). In 2070, this amounts to 187.5 million m3 per year
of supercritical, pressurised CO2.
Ranking the scenarios
In an attempt to summarise and consolidate the results discussed
above, the scenarios have been ranked based on their sustainability per-
formance. A simpliﬁed approach – summed-rank analysis – has been
used for these purposes, as shown in Table 7. The 2009 mix and the re-
sults for 2070 for each sub-scenario have been ranked for each sustain-
ability indicator and their individual ranks summed up to obtain a single
score; the lower the score, the better the option. To avoid bias owing to
the different number of indicators for the techno-economic, environ-
mental and social dimensions of sustainability, the summed ranks
have ﬁrst been created for each dimension and then the overall ranking
estimated based on the summed ranks for the three dimensions. It
should be stressed that this is a simplistic analysis that ignores both
the distribution of results for individual indicators and the importance
of the issues addressed by each indicator: each indicator is given equal
weightwithin its group. Amore robust approachwould be to use stake-
holder preference weightings in a multi-criteria decision analysis, but
this is beyond the scope of the study. Therefore, the summed-rank
results discussed below are only valid within the limits described
above and should be viewed tentatively: they are a generic simpliﬁca-
tion of the complex information created by the study.
As shown in Table 7, the 2009 mix is preferable from the techno-
economic perspective with a score of 37, followed by 100%-2 which has
an equal share of nuclear and renewables, with 39. The renewable-
intensive 100%-1 and CCS-intensive 65%-1 have the joint worst score of
47 for techno-economic performance. In termsof environmental impacts,
100%-2 has the best score of 21, followed by 80% with 25. The 2009 mix
and 100%-1 are the worst ranked options. However, 100%-1 appears to
be the best option from the social perspective, followed by 100%-2,
with the 2009 mix being the worst.
The overall ranking suggests that all 2070 electricity mixes are
superior to the 2009 mix with the exception of 65%-1 which scores
the same (13). The best option, within the limitations of this simpliﬁed
ranking approach, is 100%-2 (score of 5), followed by 80% (9). It is
important to note that, as discussed in the Future scenarios section,
the lower carbon scenarios would require energy storage and
demand-side management solutions in order to match supply to de-
mand, but the impacts of these have not been included in this study be-
cause of lack of data.
Conclusions
This study has assessed the techno-economic, environmental and
social sustainability of potential future electricity scenarios for the UK.
Whilst the scenarios and technologies considered are only a sample of
possible electricity futures, they do provide some robust conclusions
and implications for energy policy. Compromises appear inevitable and,
of the scenarios analysed, no one represents an obviouswinning solution.
Table 7
Summed rank analysis of each sub-scenario in 2070.
2070 electricity mix
Issue addressed Indicator 2009 mix 65%-1 65%-2 80% 100%-1 100%-2
Techno-economic Operability 1. Capacity factor 1 4 2 5 6 3
2. Availability factor 6 5 4 2 1 3
3. Technical dispatchability 1 2 3 5 6 4
4. Economic dispatchability 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. Lifetime of global fuel reserves at current extraction rates 6 4 5 2 1 3
Technological Lock-in resistance 6. Ratio of plant ﬂexibility 1 2 3 4 5 6
Immediacy 7. Time to plant start-up from start of construction 6 4 5 2 1 3
Levelised cost of generation 8. Capital costs 1 3 2 5 6 4
9. Operation and maintenance costs 1 6 3 5 4 2
10. Fuel costs 6 5 4 2 3 1
11. Total levelised cost 1 5 2 4 6 3
Cost variability 12. Fuel price sensitivity 6 5 4 2 3 1
Summed techno-economic scores 37 47 40 42 47 39
Techno-economic sustainability ranking 1 5 3 4 5 2
Environmental Material recyclability 13. Recyclability of input materials 6 3 5 2 1 4
Water eco-toxicity 14. Freshwater eco-toxicity potential 6 1 4 2 5 3
15. Marine eco-toxicity potential 6 5 4 3 2 1
Global warming 16. Global warming potential 6 5 4 2 3 1
Ozone layer depletion 17. Ozone depletion potential 6 4 3 2 5 1
Acidiﬁcation 18. Acidiﬁcation potential 6 5 3 2 4 1
Eutrophication 19. Eutrophication potential 6 3 4 2 5 1
Photochemical smog 20. Photochemical smog creation potential 6 5 3 2 4 1
Land use & quality 21. Land occupation 1 2 3 4 6 5
22. Terrestrial eco-toxicity potential 1 5 2 4 6 3
Environmental summed score 50 38 35 25 41 21
Environmental sustainability ranking 6 4 3 2 5 1
Social Provision of employment 23. Direct employment 6 5 4 2 1 3
24. Total employment 6 3 5 2 1 4
Human health impacts 25. Worker injuries 5 6 3 2 4 1
26. Human toxicity potential (excluding radiation) 6 1 3 4 2 5
27. Human health impacts from radiation 3 2 5 4 1 6
Large accident risk 28. Fatalities due to large accidents 5 6 4 3 2 1
Energy security 29. Amount of imported fossil fuel potentially avoided 6 5 4 3 2 1
30. Diversity of fuel supply mix 5 6 4 2 1 3
31. Fuel storage capabilities 4 5 2 3 6 1
Nuclear proliferation 32. Online refuelling; reprocessing; enriched uranium 3 1 5 4 1 6
Intergenerational equity 33. Use of abiotic resources (elements) 1 2 3 5 6 4
34. Use of abiotic resources (fossil fuels) 5 6 4 3 2 1
35. Volume of radioactive waste to be stored 3 1 5 4 1 6
36. Volume of liquid CO2 to be stored 1 6 5 4 3 1
Social summed scores 59 55 56 45 33 43
Social sustainability ranking 6 4 5 3 1 2
OVERALL SUSTAINABILITY SUMMED SCORE 13 13 11 9 11 5
OVERALL SUSTAINABILITY SUMMED RANKING =5 & 6 =5 & 6 =3 & 4 2 =3 & 4 1
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follows for each scenario in turn.
A failure tomeet UKGHG emission targets is illustrated by the 65%-1
and 65%-2 sub-scenarios (although substantial decarbonisation still
occurs). The total cost of 65%-2 is the lowest of all the scenarios consid-
ered (8.7 pence/kWh in 2070) owing to considerable use of nuclear
power, coal CCS and natural gas, all of which are expected to be cheaper
than offshore wind and solar PV even beyond 2050. However, all
scenarios are more expensive than the present-day electricity mix:
even 65%-2 is estimated to be 14% more costly per kilowatt-hour.
Conversely, due to replacement of gas capacity with other options, both
65%-1 and 65%-2 are less than half as sensitive to fuel price volatility – a
major cause of recent energy price increases – as the present day.
By 2070, both 65%-1 and 65%-2 achieve direct GHG emissions 80%
lower than in 1990 but this is too late according to UK targets which
require full decarbonisation of the electricity sector by 2050. It is also
evident that emissions reduction results in an increase in other environ-
mental impacts, particularly in 65%-1, for which annual photochemical
smog, terrestrial eco-toxicity and land use go up compared to present
day. The primary cause of these increases is the adoption of coal CCS,
which provides 55% of electricity in 65%-1 by 2070. Owing to a lack
of data for the coal CCS, it is also likely that human toxicity, freshwa-
ter eco-toxicity and eutrophication impacts of 65%-1 have been
underestimated.Although employment in the electricity life cycle increases in all sce-
narios, it is notable that 65% scenarios are only competitivewith the 80%
and 100% scenarios in terms of total employment: half of the total is in-
direct, predominantly in coal mining, because of coal CCS. Use of coal
CCS in the 65% sub-scenarios also results in higher worker injury rates,
large accident fatalities and depletion of fossil fuels than in any other
scenario. In the case of large accident fatalities and depletion of fossil
fuels, the 2070 impacts of 65%-1 are worse than the present day (by
41% and 38%, respectively). This worsening of fossil fuel depletion is a
clear deterioration in intergenerational equity, as is the burden of care
and risk associated with the 188 million m3/yr of supercritical CO2
requiring storage by 2070 in 65%-1 (and 68 million m3/yr in 65%-2).
This rate of CO2 production is equivalent toﬁllingWindermere (England's
largest lake) every 20 months (calculated with data from International
Lake Environment Committee, 2012).
A more ambitious attempt to decarbonise is represented in the 80%
scenario, in which the electricity sector matches the UK's whole-
economy reduction target of 80% by 2050. In this case, a balanced elec-
tricitymix is used.Whilst per-kWh costs are higher than thepresent (by
25%), and capital expenditure much higher (by 96%), sensitivity to fuel
price changes is greatly reduced (by 73%), meaning a large increase in
the cost of coal, gas or uranium would have very little effect on the
generation cost of electricity. This provides more security against a po-
tentially volatile future fuel market. The move away from gas and coal
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over the present.
The environmental impacts of the 80% scenario are considerably
better than those of the 2009 electricity mix despite an overall increase
in electricity consumption. Apart from terrestrial eco-toxicity potential
and land occupation, all annual environmental impacts decrease by
about 40% ormore by 2070. In the case of terrestrial eco-toxicity, the im-
pact per unit generated in 2070 only increases slightly relative to the
present (17%), but higher electricity demand in future results in a 50%
increase in the annual burden.
The social impacts of 80% are mixed relative to the present: employ-
ment, avoided fossil fuel use, fuel storage capabilities, large accident
fatalities and depletion of fossil fuels all improve by at least 50% (on
an annual basis; more per kWh). On the other hand, health impacts
from radiation, potential for nuclear proliferation, depletion of elements
and long-termwaste storage all worsen by at least 90% owing to a com-
bination of increased nuclear generation, production of solar PV compo-
nents and CO2 from CCS. Thus the overall judgement will depend on
societal preference and context: for instance, health impacts from radi-
ationmay be seen as very minor compared to everyday hazards such as
road trafﬁc and air pollution and depletion of elements could be greatly
reduced by improving end-of-life recycling rates.
The 100%-1 and 100%-2 sub-scenarios reﬂect the scale of electricity
decarbonisation thought to be necessary tomeet the UK's 80% reduction
target for the whole economy. In both cases, coal CCS expansion is
severely curtailed by ever-tighteningGHGemission constraints,meaning
plants may not be able to operate for their full lifespan: even with CCS,
direct emissions from coal plants are too high. Therefore, it would not
be advisable to allow coal CCS penetration of more than about 10% at
any time in the coming decades. This is in contrast with UK government's
policy which expects up to 48% of supply to come from CCS by 2050
(although this also includes gas and biomass CCS) (DECC, 2011a).
This suggests that, a) CCS investment should proceed with caution to
avoid short-termism that would penalise alternative options and,
b) large-scale investment in infrastructure for CCS should not be moti-
vated by coal: gas and biomass may be more appropriate but both
require sustainability assessment (which was beyond the scope of this
study).
Decarbonising electricity to the extent required by the 100% scenario
creates considerable uncertainty: the variability of wind and PV coupled
with the low dispatchability of nuclear power mean that such a mix is
not technological feasible under today's conditions. Huge amounts of
grid-level storage, demand management and other balancing mecha-
nisms would likely be necessary, despite the use of biomass for load-
following. All of this creates extra costs, environmental impacts and social
consequences. The effects of these are currently unknown and should be
prioritised as a focus of research.
Nevertheless, the 100%-1 and 100%-2 sub-scenarios demonstrate
several points. Firstly, achieving this level of decarbonisation is not neces-
sarily more costly than achieving far less ambitious reductions: the over-
all cost of 100%-2 is comparable to both 65% sub-scenarios. However,
costs increase signiﬁcantly if nuclear power is avoided: by 2070, 100%-1
(which lacks nuclear) costs 43%more per kilowatt-hour than the present
day, taking into account cost reductions for immature technologies. If nu-
clear is included, as in 100%-2, costs are only 14% higher than the present.
This is because in this scenario nuclear provides 50% of electricity, reduc-
ing the amount needed from the renewables such as wind and solar PV,
therefore reducing the costs per kilowatt-hour generated. Capital intensi-
ty also increases greatly, particularly in 100%-1, emphasising the impor-
tance of market conﬁdence and capital interest rates.
Regarding environmental impacts, increasing penetration of nuclear
and renewables generally improves environmental sustainability:
100%-2 is the best option for six out of ten indicators. It is noteworthy
that 100%-1 has around twice the life cycle global warming potential
of 100%-2 in 2070 despite their both having the same direct GHG emis-
sions. This is mainly because solar PV still has higher life cycle GHGemissions than nuclear power, even given technological advances by
2070. This outcome demonstrates the need to focus on life cycle emis-
sions rather than direct emissions. This is particularly important as
decarbonisation of electricity leads us away from the use of fossil
fuels, reducing the importance of direct GHG emissions from fuel com-
bustion and increasing the inﬂuence of construction materials used in
non-fossil technologies.
Increasing the installed capacity of renewables increases employment,
particularly in operation andmaintenance,meaningmuch of the employ-
ment creation is likely to be in the UK. In the most renewable-intensive
scenario (100%-1), total employment increases by 137% over the present
to 109,300 full-time-equivalent jobs in 2070. Of these, 70% are ‘direct’ jobs
(in installation and operation/maintenance) that are likely to be based
in the UK. By 2070, 100%-1 and 100%-2 avoid 97 million tonnes of oil-
equivalent per year compared to the present-day fossil ﬂeet. Sub-
scenario 100%-2 is also the best option in terms of fuel storage capabilities
(158% better than 2009) owing to high penetration of nuclear power; this
provides security against supply disruptions. Conversely, 100%-2 also has
the highest human toxicity potential (19% higher in 2070 than in 2009)
and radiation health impacts (223%higher) although, as discussed earlier,
the radiation-induced health impacts are still extremely small. It should
also be borne inmind that the human toxicity impacts of coal CCS-reliant
scenarios, such as 65%-1, may have been underestimated and might in
fact be worse than 100%-2. Finally, 100%-2 produces the most nuclear
waste – nearly 2500 m3/year – but this compares to 724,000 m3/year of
supercritical CO2 for storage in 100%-1 despite coal CCS only providing
0.2% of electricity by 2070; thus the total volume of long-term nuclear
waste is small compared to scenarios with serious contributions from
coal CCS. When nuclear is avoided and more emphasis is placed on re-
newables, as in 100%-1, depletion of elements is 6.5 times higher than
for the presentmix, mainly owing to the solar PV life cycle. This increases
material scarcity for future generations, although recycling couldmitigate
some of the effect.
If equal importance for all sustainability indicators is assumed, then
scenario 100%-2 is found to be the best option, followedby 80%.However,
if the latter is realised, the UK misses its GHG emission targets. On the
other hand, the former is probably unrealistic without energy storage
and demand-side management solutions in order to match supply to
demand.
As this work demonstrates, the decarbonisation of the UK electricity
mix introduces many questions regarding sustainability, some of which
have been addressed in this paper. Despite a relatively limited number
of technologies considered, this study illustrates that the level of
decarbonisation achieved and the approach taken can lead to greatly
diverging outcomes, each involving trade-offs and compromise. There-
fore, decisions on the future of the electricity system in the UK (and
elsewhere) should be based on an open stakeholder dialogue which
considers a range of sustainability aspects rather than climate change
alone to ensure that the GHG emission targets are not met at the ex-
pense of other sustainability issues. As this analysis demonstrates,
decarbonisation in linewith government targets requires extreme elec-
tricity mixes with uncertain impacts owing to the current technological
limitations of matching electrical supply and demand. These should be
explored and understood fully to warrant ‘no regret’ decisions and a
sustainable transformation of the electricity system in the UK.Acknowledgements
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